The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate
attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A
remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can
cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of
malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.
 
Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected:

1. SETTINGS entry count -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit
   numSettings from the payload and allocates a slice of that size
   without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker
   can set numSettings to a value far exceeding the actual payload,
   triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.
    
2. Header count -- parseHeaderValueBlock reads a 32-bit
   numHeaders from the decompressed header block and allocates an
   http.Header map of that size with no upper bound.
    
3. Header field size -- Individual header name and value lengths are
   read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with
   no validation.
    
   Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire
   payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser
   interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is
   enough to exhaust process memory.

Impact

 Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly
or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can
send SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single
crafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.

Affected versions

 github.com/moby/spdystream <= v0.5.0

Fix

 v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related
hardening:
 
Core fixes:
 

• SETTINGS entry-count validation -- The SETTINGS frame reader now
  checks that numSettings is consistent with the declared frame
  length (numSettings <= (length-4)/8) before allocating.
   
• Header count limit -- parseHeaderValueBlock enforces a maximum
  number of headers per frame (default: 1000).
   
• Header field size limit -- Individual header name and value
  lengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB)
  before allocation.
   
• Connection closure on protocol error -- The connection read loop
  now closes the underlying net.Conn when it encounters an
  InvalidControlFrame error, preventing further exploitation on the
  same connection.
   
  Additional hardening:
   
• Write-side bounds checks -- All frame write methods now verify
  that payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the
  library from producing invalid frames.
   
  Configurable limits:
   
• Callers can adjust the defaults using NewConnectionWithOptions or
  the lower-level spdy.NewFramerWithOptions with functional options:
  WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize, WithMaxHeaderFieldSize, and
  WithMaxHeaderCount.