chore(barcode): Added security policy (#766)

Author: tillmann-crabnebula

plugins/barcode-scanner/SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+**Do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.**
+
+**Please use the [Private Vulnerability Disclosure](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing-information-about-vulnerabilities/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability#privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) feature of GitHub.**
+
+Include as much of the following information:
+
+- Type of issue (e.g. improper input parsing, privilege escalation, etc.)
+- The location of the affected source code (tag/branch/commit or direct URL)
+- Any special configuration required to reproduce the issue
+- The distribution affected or used to help us with reproduction of the issue
+- Step-by-step instructions to reproduce the issue
+- Ideally a reproduction repository
+- Impact of the issue, including how an attacker might exploit the issue
+
+We prefer to receive reports in English.
+
+## Contact
+
+Please disclose a vulnerability or security relevant issue here: [https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/security/advisories/new](https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/security/advisories/new).
+
+Alternatively, you can also contact us by email via [security@tauri.app](mailto:security@tauri.app).
+
+## Threat Model
+
+As there are only the `scan` and `cancel` commands exposed to the frontend,
+there is no additional risk or exposure of additional information.
+Only barcodes are passed and no raw camera access is used, which means no images are available to the frontend.
+
+The application is only usable on iOS and Android and therefore the specific mobile operating system security boundaries need to be considered.
+
+### Security Assumptions
+
+- The QR code parsing into a link/text is trusted and correctly handled by the mobile operating system
+- The link itself is untrusted and additional validation/sanitization needs to be handled by the app developer
+- The camera is not passing images to the app
+- The camera permission is granted at first use by the user and can be revoked at any time
+- The Android manifest also states that the camera permission is required
+
+### Threats
+
+#### Silent Interaction
+
+##### When is it possible?
+
+The following threat is either caused by a malicious developer, which has further implications and should be considered as a full compromise of an application or system, or by
+compromise of the application frontend. In the second case there are several impact minimization methods (e.g. the CSP) and if all of these fail the possible risk could occur.
+Therefore it is unlikely to occur in most cases but should be considered when using this plugin.
+
+##### What is possible?
+
+The camera has two modes. The first one is where the user can see the background camera image and no further interaction is possible.
+The second mode allows the developer to assist the user and add a transparent overlay to the image, providing hints or additional information (like a link preview).
+The overlay could be made non-transparent by the application frontend and as long as the app is open (and in some cases) it could read QR codes in range of the camera lense.
+
+
+#### Out Of Scope
+
+- Exploits in the operating system QR code parsing functionality
+- Exploits based on the string passed to the application using this plugin
+- Continous camera/QR scan usage even when application is in background
+
+## Best Practices
+
+There is no additional exposure aside from reading barcodes in the webview and there are no specific best practices for secure usage.